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Abstract 
During the Edo period, Japanese production of silver declined drastically. Japan could not 
export silver in order to import cotton, sugar, raw silk and tea from China. Japan was forced to 
carry out import-substitution. Because Japan adopted seclusion policy and did not produce big 
ship, it used small ships for coastal trade, which contributed to the growth of national economy. 
Japanese economic growth during the Edo period was indeed Smithian, but it formed the base 
of economic development in Meiji period. 
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1.Introduction 
Owing to the strong influence of Marxism, and Japan’s defeat in World War II, Japanese 
historians dismissed the Edo period (1603–1867) as a stagnating period. Japan, during this 
period, was regarded as a country that lagged behind Europe because of its underdeveloped 
social and economic systems. It had been closed to the outside world for over two hundred 
years, as a result of its Sakoku (seclusion) policy, and could not, therefore, progress as rapidly as 
Europe and the United States. 
This image of Japan during the Edo period began to change in the 1980s, and this period is 
now viewed as an age of economic growth, even if Japan’s growth rates were not as rapid as 
those of Europe. Economic growth during the Edo period is now even considered to be the 
foundation for the economic growth that occurred after the Meiji period.  
In this paper, I will develop three arguments that demonstrate the veracity of the above 
viewpoint. The first emphasizes Japan’s connections with the outside world. As Japan is a 
country surrounded by seas, maritime networks were of great importance in its economic history, 
although their role has often been underrated. Japan exported significant quantities of silver 
during the course of the seventeenth century to be able to import goods—cotton, sugar, raw silk 
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 and tea. However, with depleting silver supplies, Japan was compelled to substitute imports.  
Second, with regard to the domestic economy, production and productivity of agricultural 
goods increased because of very low taxation on commercial activities. However, the salaries of 
Samurais remained fixed. This warrior class, therefore, became poorer compared with the 
agricultural and commercial classes, notably peasants, farmers, craftsmen and merchants.  
Third, although Japan had developed a military regime by the beginning of the Edo period, 
which continued up to the end of this period in 1867, it remained at peace. I will examine the 
economic growth of the military regime during this period without wars.  
 
2. Japanese Maritime History 
Although Japan is an insular country, its maritime history has rarely been a main topic of 
study in Japanese history. Japanese economic history during the early modern period has been 
widely perceived as a history of peasants, or of agricultural history, because most Japanese 
people were assumed to be peasants until the end of World War II. Rice has been the country’s 
most important agricultural commodity since ancient times. The image of peasants working in 
rice fields has been, and continues to be, a common one that the Japanese have about their 
ancestors.  
This is, however, only an ‘image’ and not a fact that Japanese maintain about their ancestors. 
Yoshihiko Amin1 (1928–2004) completely changed Japanese historiography in relation to the 
sea. It is true that by the time the Ritsuryo system (borrowed from China) was established at the 
end of the seventh century, Japanese public documents were predominantly focused on the 
rice-field. At the same time, however, we should not ignore the important role of seas in 
Japanese history. 
Japanese villages (mura) did not always just mean rural or hillside areas. They also 
sometimes included seaside villages. Japanese historians have, however, tended to overestimate 
the significance of rural areas and rice fields. Amino emphasized the roles of the Kaimin, people 
                                            
* This paper is based on a paper I presented at a workshop entitled, ‘Early Modern Economy 
and Trade: Nordic and Portuguese Experiences’, held on December 13–14 at the University of 
Jyvaskyla. I wish to express my thanks to all of the participants, and especially to the organizer, 
Jari Ojala. 
1 See, Amino (2007–2009). 
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 who mainly lived off sea-related activities. During the latter part of the Jomon Age (around 
4000 BC), we find that there were some entrepôts located along the coastline bordering the Sea 
of Japan. During this period, the Japanese traded with China, Korea and Russia. The Sea of 
Japan was, therefore, an important Asian trading route. Moreover, Japanese commerce is 
thought to have been initiated by the salt merchants who lived along the Setonai-kai (a Japanese 
inland sea located between Chugoku and Shikoku). By the twelfth century, the Japanese 
coastline was well connected through the use of sea-vessels. The Daimyo (feudal lords) who 
used these vessels depended on each other. Principal products were exchanged through coastal 
trade. As in the case of Europe, Japanese merchants had their own commercial networks 
entailing overland and sea routes; the latter created primarily by the Kaimin.  
The Kaimin sometimes acted simultaneously as merchants and pirates. For example, the 
Wako, who engaged in commerce as well as smuggling and invasion, haunted the coasts of 
China and Korea from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. During the sixteenth century, 
most Wako strongholds were Chinese, and not Japanese, and the Wako retained independence 
from Japanese governments. Japanese Kaimin thus engaged in trade independently from the 
policies of Japanese governments.  
 
3. The Role of Silver 
As mentioned above, Japan was connected to other Asian countries, especially through the 
activities of the Kaimin. The history described in this paper is one that focuses attention on the 
roles of people. A key question that arises is: what was the most significant commodity 
connecting Japan with the outside world? In the early modern world,2 the most important 
commodity traded globally was silver. Significant quantities of silver were exported from South 
America to Europe and from the Pacific to Asia. In particular, exports from Japan, a primary 
silver producer, to China were considerable. Thus, silver circulated all over the world. 
There were many silver mines in Japan, and Japanese coins contained a high proportion of 
the precious metal. For example, the Keicho-gin coin (1601) was composed of 80 per cent silver. 
China and other Asian countries were, therefore, willing to import this Japanese coin. From the 
                                            
2 Flynn and Giráldez.(1995), 201–221. 
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 end of the sixteenth century up to the first half of the seventeenth century, it is estimated that 
about one-third of the world’s silver was produced in Japan.  
The volume of silver exports from Japan was impressive. According to estimates by Kobata 
Atsushi, Japanese silver exports amounted to nearly twenty thousand kilograms per year.3 Even 
after the 1630s, when the Sakoku policy was in full force, Japanese silver exports continued. 
Goods imported by Japan from China included commodities such as cotton, sugar, raw silk and 
tea. Much of Japan’s silver exports were to China to settle the trade balance.  
Japan exported silver to China via Nagasaki, Tsushima and Ryukyu, with much of the silver 
coming directly from Nagasaki. Silver from Tsushima was exported via Korea to China. It was 
also exported from Satsuma via Ryukyu to China. In the seventeenth century, China was the 
most affluent country in Asia and, arguably, in the world. Considerable amounts of silver were 
exported to China from Asian as well as European countries, with silver exports from Japan 
being the most substantial. However, Nagasaki differed from other Japanese silver trading hubs. 
Whereas Nagasaki was included in the territorial orbit of the Tokugawa Shogunate, also known 
as Tokugawa Bakufu (Government), the other trading centres were part of the territories of the 
various Daimyo. Nagasaki was the most important hub in the trade route with China and was 
directly controlled by the Tokugawa government. Early modern Japanese history was thus 
closely associated with the global circulation of silver.  
 
4. The Foundation of Japanese Economic Growth 
From around 1470, many of the Daimyo became independent and actively fought with each 
other. This was, therefore, a period of Sengoku Jidai, or warfare, in Japan. The Daimyo required 
considerable sums of money to wage wars as well as to survive them. They therefore needed to 
support and promote commerce which they did to a considerable extent. For example, Oda 
Nobunaga (1534–1582) adopted a policy of Rakuichi Rakuza which involved establishing a free 
market to replace the monopoly of the guilds, thereby supporting the development of commerce. 
The import of guns from Portugal during the second half of the sixteenth century was an 
important factor that contributed to a ‘Military Revolution’ in Japan.  
                                            
3 Kobata (1968). 
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 Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536/37–1598), who was responsible for reuniting Japan in 1590, 
began to trade by way of Shuin sen (ships used for foreign trade) with the formal permission of 
the Japanese authorities. The government subsequently took control of this highly profitable 
foreign trade.  
Every time Hideyoshi conquered a new territory, he had the land surveyed. He succeeded in 
simplifying the previously complex relationship between land and estates and established a 
unified land system. This became the basis of the kokudaka-sei (rice-standard) during the Edo 
Period. Consequently, every Daimyo’s tax contribution was calculated in terms of rice 
production. This system was known as Taikou Kenchi (Taiko indicated Hideyoshi’s rank and 
kenchi meant land survey). It completely eradicated the old feudal manor system, signalling the 
end of the medieval era and the beginning of the modern period in Japan. Moreover, it 
contributed to the establishment of centralisation within bureaucratic systems. During the Edo 
Period, every Samurai, or member of the Samurai class, received his salary in rice. A rice 
standard was adopted during the early modern period in Japan. Hideyoshi’s system suited the 
Japanese economy of this period and continued up to the end of the Edo Period. Hideyoshi is 
also credited with unifying the system of weights and measures which was a major advance for 
the economy.  
Moreover, although Hideyoshi was born as the son of a peasant, he carried out the 
Katanagari which completely separated soldiers from peasants. The Katanagari became a 
foundation of Japan’s social ranking system. In this system, the Samurai were ranked the 
highest, followed by peasants or farmers, then craftsmen, and lastly the merchant class which 
was ranked the lowest. Whereas farmers were allowed to possess swords before the introduction 
of Hideyoshi’s Katanagari, they were now demilitarised. Through Hideyoshi’s administrative 
reforms, the Japanese social hierarchy became fixed, marking a major constitutional revolution 
in Japanese history.  
Thanks to its affluence from silver, Japan did not need to carry out financial revolutions of 
the kind that occurred in European countries. The Tokugawa Bakufu attempted to stop the 
export of silver and copper, especially after the 1660s when the production of silver and copper 
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 declined,4 and by around 1750, Japanese silver mines were severely depleted. Nevertheless, 
Japanese governments at the centre did not issue paper money, probably because their 
governance structure was still closely connected with the rice-standard. If the government had 
levied taxes on commerce, the rice-standard could not have been maintained, because the 
importance of rice as a source of revenue would have dramatically declined. Therefore, the 
Bakufu was compelled to continue implementing the rice-standard system. Japan began to carry 
out import-substitution, because it could no longer export silver to enable it to import 
commodities from China. Key commodities such as cotton, sugar, raw silk, tea and ginseng, 
which had earlier been imported from China and Korea, were being cultivated in Japan by the 
end of the eighteenth century. 
 
5. The Seclusion System 
Japan did not close itself off completely to the rest of the world. Trade with China and the 
Netherlands continued via the island of Deshima, while trade with Korea was carried out from a 
trading house located on Tsushima han, an island situated in close proximity to the Korean 
peninsula. Even during the Sakoku period, Tsushima han officially traded with Korea. This was 
because of Japan’s import of ginseng from Korea. Through these routes, Japanese silver and 
copper continued to be exported to foreign countries. Moreover, Satsuma traded with Ryukyu 
(Okinawa), while trade with Ainu (Hokkaido) proceeded through Matsumae han. These trade 
routes were known as the ‘Four Mouths’. In other words, Japanese Kaimin could still trade with 
foreign countries. Thus, Japan did not completely close itself off, but it controlled its trade by 
restricting foreign trade to one port. This was a common policy in Asia at the time. 
The Kaimin were more actively engaged in domestic coastal trade. Because the Tokugawa 
government had banned the building of big ships, smaller boats were built and used for coastal 
trade. The lengthy Japanese coastlines and the rest of Japan were connected using these smaller 
boats. In the course of the Edo period, there was an increase in the number of special 
agricultural products which began to be exchanged across land or coastal routes, or across both 
routes.  
                                            
4 Kobata (1968). 
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 The central rice market was located in Osaka.5 Whereas the western part of Japan used a 
silver standard, the eastern part used a gold standard. If the price movement of other 
commodities differed from rice, the economy would have faced a challenging situation which it 
did during the Edo period.  
 
6. Tokugawa Yoshimune 
By the turn of the eighteenth century, it had become increasingly difficult to export silver, 
because Japanese silver stocks were almost completely depleted. Yoshimune became the eighth 
Shogun in 1716. His efforts to keep rice prices stable earned him the name Kome Shogun (Rice 
Shogun). Moreover, his reform, known as Kyouho no Kaikaku, was aimed at recovering the 
power of the Samurai class. Yoshimune tried to stabilize the Tokugawa government’s fiscal 
system and imposed higher tax on the Japanese people. The tax ratio was changed from 30 per 
cent to 50 per cent of peasants’ incomes. One of his eminent vassals, Ooka Tadasuke (1677–
1752) made valiant attempts to control rice prices but all efforts failed.6 Even if Yoshimune’s 
efforts could be considered successful, it became increasingly difficult to regulate the price of 
rice, because this was not under the control of Tokugawa Bakufu. Moreover, the number of 
available foodstuffs, apart from rice, increased, and the quality of Japanese meals also 
improved—trends to which Yoshimune contributed.  
In order to soften the effects of a bad harvest and famine, Yoshimune introduced 
satsumaimo (sweet potato). Given Japan’s unfavourable trade balance with Korea, he also 
introduced the plantation of ginseng as a substitute for importing this item from Korea. 
Yoshimune’s attempt to carry out import substitution succeeded. By the end of the eighteenth 
century, Japan had further succeeded in substituting the import of key commodities, notably, 
cotton, sugar, raw silk and tea, which began to be exported at the beginning of the Meiji Period 
(1868–1912). Yoshimune is, therefore, viewed as the Shogun who recovered Tokugawa’s 
economy.  
Farmers and peasants began to cultivate more vegetables and other foodstuffs for markets 
                                            
5 Miyamoto (1988). 
6 Oishi (1974), 96–130.  
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 and fairs. Marine products, which were produced by the Kaimin, were also exchanged at these 
markets and fairs. Consequently, the central importance of the price of rice declined. This, in 
turn, raised significant challenges for the fiscal system of the Tokugawa regime, contributing to 
its eventual collapse as the fiscal system of the Bakufu was based on the rice standard and rice 
production. 
 
7. A Military Regime without Wars 
From the 1630s to the 1850s, Japan was at peace. Paradoxically, however, the Japanese 
constitution was a military one. Thus, in the absence of wars, Japan was still a fiscal-military 
state.7 During this peaceful age, the warrior class had no role to play, and became useless. They 
forgot how to fight. The image of the Japanese ‘Samurai’ is, therefore, an illusory one. In reality, 
members of this class became bureaucrats. The Tokugawa government did not need to equip 
itself with a navy or army, but it did need to maintain the Samurai, who were transformed into 
bureaucrats and provided with bureaucratic jobs to save them from becoming jobless. In the age 
of war, the governments needed many vassals as troops. In the age of peace, these same troops 
were useless and became superfluous. During the Edo period, almost all official posts were 
shared by more than two persons. This system thus provided a kind of working share and was 
applied to the Samurai.  
The Tokugawa Bakufu exerted significant control over the Daimyo, compelling them to 
undergo Sankinkoutai. According to this system, every Daimyo had to stay in Edo for a full year 
every two years. This proved too costly for the Daimyo. They needed to stay in good 
accommodation and spent large amounts of money for their travel. As a result of Sankinkoutai, 
Japan’s main roads were considerably improved. Thus, the policy of Sankinkoutai lent positive 
effects to Japanese economic development at the cost of the Daimyo. Though we cannot exactly 
estimate all of the costs that the Daimyo had to bear, the sum total of these costs might have 
exceeded those of the wars. 
In contrast with Europe, Tokugawa Japan lacked excise tax. The tax burdens on commerce 
and commercial commodities were, therefore, very light. During the course of the Tokugawa 
period, whereas living standards among farmers, peasants, craftsmen, merchants and traders 
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 increased, the disposable incomes of the Samurai did not show much change because their 
incomes were fixed. The Japanese ‘contractor state’ thus promoted economic growth while 
retarding the economic prosperity of the Samurai. 
 
8. Industrious Revolution?8 
Regarding Tokugawa Japan’s economic development, Hayami Akira has suggested that an 
‘Industrious Revolution’ took place in Japan.9 He argues that whereas the domestication of 
cattle decreased, the number of peasants cultivating the fields conversely increased, resulting in 
longer working hours for peasants. Japanese economic development was made possible by 
inputting more labour (without the use of labour saving technology). In other words, the 
peasants took the place of the cattle and worked longer. Thus, according to Hayami, Japan 
experienced an ‘Industrious Revolution’, leading to economic growth, in contrast with Europe 
where economic growth was achieved through an Industrial Revolution. The term ‘Industrious 
Revolution’ is now used by many historians in different contexts.  
However, Hayami did not present concrete data of longer working hours by peasants. It is 
possible that peasants worked more efficiently than cattle. Considering the small size of 
Japanese rice fields, the use of cattle may not have been an efficient method for increasing 
productivity. We can see improvements in farming implements as well as in irrigation systems. 
However, Hayami’s conclusion was based on too little evidence. We should, therefore, use the 
term ‘Industrious Revolution’ more cautiously. I will consider this aspect from a different 
perspective. 
Japanese villages had the right to decide on their own holidays. During the Edo period, the 
number of village holidays increased. Therefore, I do not agree with Hayami’s thesis that Japan 
experienced an ‘Industrious Revolution’. Rather, I suggest that the productivity of lands 
increased and peasants could, therefore, enjoy the longer holidays.  
The living standards of peasants, farmers and craftsmen were enhanced during the Edo 
period. If this had not been the case, they could not have sent their children to private schools in 
                                                                                                                                
7 Tamaki (2011),155–179. 
8 This section is based on Tamaki (2011),76–177. 
9 Hayami(2003). 
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 Terakoya to learn how to read, write and calculate. Japan’s high literacy rate, even among 
women at this time, is a well-known fact among economic historians in Japan as well as in other 
countries.10 This high rate can be attributed to the education facilities at Terakoya and to the 
increasing wealth of families able to avail of them.  
 
9. The Importance of Information 
The Tokugawa Bakufu authorities were able to obtain information about foreign countries 
using various information-gathering techniques. Because of its insularity, the government was 
able to control the inflow of foreign information by controlling activities of the ‘Four Mouths’ 
trading ports, especially Nagasaki. This enabled the Tokugawa Bakufu to centralise the 
information-gathering system regarding foreign activities.  
In 1616, all ships, with the exception of those from Ming China, were permitted to sail to 
Hirado in Nagasaki. However, in 1624, the Japanese government forbade Spanish ships from 
entering Japan’s maritime waters, and in 1638, Portuguese ships were denied entrance 
altogether into Japanese ports. In 1641, the Sakoku policy was brought into full effect with the 
shifting of the Dutch mercantile house (Nagasaki Shokan) to Deshima.  
In addition to highlighting the significance of the above-mentioned ‘Four Mouths’ routes in 
information-gathering, it is also important to note the roles of the Chosen-Tsushinshi (Korean 
Missions to Shogun) and the Oranda-Fusetsugaki (Dutch merchants).11 Whenever ships arrived 
in Deshima, the Tokugawa Bakufu demanded information and reports on foreign countries from 
the Oranda-Fusetsugaki. In this way, the Bakufu was able to gather critical information on 
foreign countries, and, more importantly, to monopolise that information.  
However, this monopoly of information by the Bakufu became increasingly unfeasible. 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, Rangaku, which means to learn about Dutch 
culture and the Netherlands, began to flourish, with the number of Japanese able to read Dutch 
significantly increasing. The Japanese people were thus able to learn about foreign affairs, and 
began to contemplate doing away with the Sakoku policy. The Japanese intelligentsia began to 
notice the growing inability of the Tokugawa Bakufu to control information derived from 
                                            
10 Furukawa (2003). 
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 foreign sources. They considered this to be problematic for Japan, especially after the First 
Opium War (1840–42).  
The Tokugawa Bakufu’s loss of monopoly over the control of information from foreign 
sources was closely connected with the rise of Japanese journalism. The intelligentsia now 
began to learn about foreign affairs. During the course of the Edo period, as incomes increased, 
literacy rates also increased, enabling people to become more connected to the outside world 
through their ability to read. From the nineteenth century, foreign merchants began to carry out 
smuggling activities with the Japanese Kaimin, though the actual numbers of those involved are 
not known. Japanese coasts could not provide protection against the penetration of foreign 
influences. Before the arrival of four ships at Yokohama from the USA in 1853, Japanese 
information networks had expanded so much that a transformation of Japanese society had 
already occurred before Japan entered into the Meiji period. 
 
10.Brief Conclusion 
Japanese economic growth during the Edo period was Smithian and not Schumpeterian. In 
other words, Japanese society was not based on technology innovations. The Japanese 
succeeded in increasing productivity and the volume of production, and consequently living 
standards improved. But this may not have overcome the Malthusian trap. Therefore, Japanese 
economic growth during the Edo period faced a limitation. Nevertheless, Japan likely 
experienced moderate economic growth, and this growth became the base for the economic 
development that occurred after the Meiji period. 
Japan carried out import substitution of cotton, sugar, raw silk and tea. These were 
domestically produced and exported to foreign countries during the Meiji period, thus 
contributing to Japan’s improved balance of trade. Moreover, the development of coastal trade, 
which was stimulated by the Kaimin, enabled the birth of a Japanese national economy. 
The improved living standards of the non-Samurai class enhanced the literacy rate in Japan. 
Moreover, the spread of Rangaku among the Japanese intelligentsia became the basis for the 
acquisition of Western languages by the Japanese. All of these factors contributed to Japan’s 
rapid industrialisation during the Meiji period 
                                                                                                                                
11 Matsutaka (2007). 
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